Tuesday’s massacre in Woro, a remote community in Kaiama Local Government Area of Kwara State, which claimed an estimated 176 lives, was not a random act of violence. Investigations indicate that the attack was the outcome of a carefully planned expansion of a jihadist front that Nigeria’s security architecture failed to stop, despite advance warnings.
At the centre of the carnage is Abubakar Saidu, widely known as Sadiku—a seasoned terrorist commander whose violent footprint stretches across more than a decade and multiple regions of northern Nigeria.
From Shadow Figure to Regional Kingpin
For years, Sadiku operated largely out of public view within Nigeria’s insurgency ecosystem. However, security investigations now trace a 12-year trajectory that saw him evolve from a trusted lieutenant of the late Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau, in 2014, to what analysts describe in 2026 as the “Shekau of the North-Central.”
As sustained military offensives weakened Boko Haram strongholds in the North-East, Sadiku shifted westward, embedding himself in the vast forest corridors linking Niger and Kwara states. From these hideouts, he coordinated attacks that devastated farming communities, displaced thousands, and ultimately culminated in one of the deadliest mass killings in Kwara State’s history.
Deployed by Boko Haram
Security findings reveal that Sadiku was originally dispatched by Boko Haram to Niger State as a trusted operative charged with expanding the group’s influence beyond its traditional North-East base.
A counterterrorism analyst on X, MobilisingNigeria, linked Sadiku’s rise to his close relationship with Shekau, who reportedly handpicked him to oversee Boko Haram’s interests in Niger State.
“He later worked with Dogo Gide to expand into the North-Central terrain and also collaborated with the Darul Islam terrorist group before the police dismantled it,” the analyst wrote.
Sadiku’s temporary alliance with notorious bandit kingpin Dogo Gide enabled him to acquire weapons, intelligence, and local leverage. The partnership later collapsed over ideological differences, triggering violent clashes that left casualties on both sides.
Kainji Forest: A New Base of Terror
Following the split, Sadiku withdrew deeper into forest territories, eventually establishing a major base inside the Kainji Forest Reserve in July 2025. Security observers describe this move as a strategic shift from profit-driven banditry to a more rigid, ideology-driven campaign of terror.
Spanning Niger and Kwara states, the Kainji Forest Reserve has increasingly become a strategic hub linking insurgents from the North-East with remnants of bandit groups in the North-West. Security experts now refer to it as Nigeria’s “new Sambisa,” providing cover for recruitment, arms trafficking, and coordinated attacks across Kwara, Niger, Kebbi, and parts of Kaduna states.
A Kwara-based security expert, Hassan, said Sadiku’s relocation marked a dangerous expansion of Boko Haram-style insurgency into the North-Central zone.
“For over a decade, Boko Haram violence was concentrated in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa,” he said. “But splinter factions are now exploiting forests, weak security presence and porous borders to push westward.”
Links to Al-Qaeda Affiliate
In a separate analysis, MobilisingNigeria described Sadiku as a Boko Haram factional leader who relocated from the North-East to establish new operational bases in the North-West and North-Central regions.
International security tracker Brandon Phillips directly linked Sadiku’s faction to the Woro massacre, noting that the attack occurred less than four kilometres from Nuku, where Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)—an Al-Qaeda affiliate—claimed its first-ever attack in Nigeria in October 2025.
According to Phillips, the proximity suggests either operational collaboration or a non-aggression pact between JNIM and the Sadiku-led Boko Haram faction. He added that the Woro killings followed a pattern similar to recent attacks in Papiri, Niger State, indicating a continued southward push toward JNIM-dominated zones around the Kainji Reserve.
Between November and December 2025, Phillips said evidence of cooperation between JNIM and Sadiku’s Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’adati wal-Jihad (JAS) faction became increasingly clear, with fighters redeployed into JNIM-controlled areas of Kwara, Niger and southern Kebbi.
He also linked JNIM to the kidnapping of Catholic children in Papiri, noting that some victims were held in JNIM camps after an operation executed by Sadiku’s fighters.
Fighters Converge on Kainji Axis
Another security researcher, Raheem Mutiu, confirmed that JNIM fighters have spread across Kaiama, Baruten, Borgu and surrounding communities near the Kainji Forest Reserve.
He noted that these areas were previously controlled by the Mahmuda group, whose influence declined sharply after the arrest of its leader in August 2025.
African conflict researcher James Barnett observed that the extreme brutality of the Woro massacre distinguished Sadiku’s faction from the Mahmudawa group, which had focused largely on preaching and social control, with violence mostly triggered by military operations.
Following the Mahmuda leader’s arrest, Barnett said some fighters defected to Sadiku’s camp, while others fled into Benin Republic, consolidating Boko Haram splinter dominance around the Kainji axis.
A Warning Ignored
Investigations reveal that Woro was warned weeks before the attack.
The village head, Salihu Umar, confirmed receiving a letter written in Hausa and dated 19 Rajab 1447 (January 8), about three weeks before the massacre. Signed by JAS, the letter requested a “secret” meeting with community leaders for preaching purposes and assured residents they would not be harmed.
Umar said he photocopied the letter and submitted it to the Kaiama Emirate, while also forwarding a soft copy to the Department of State Services (DSS) office in Kaiama.
The Night of Bloodshed
On the day of the attack, eyewitnesses said the gunmen arrived around 5pm on motorcycles, armed with AK-47 rifles and explosives. They surrounded the community, sealing all exit routes.
By 6pm, the attackers stormed the Emir’s palace, dragged out his family and set the building ablaze as gunfire echoed across the town. Residents reported seeing a white helicopter with markings hover briefly over the area before departing without intervention.
Between 6:30pm and 8pm, survivors said the attackers entered what they described as an “execution phase,” rounding up men, tying their hands behind their backs, and killing them systematically.
A military aircraft reportedly reappeared around 8pm, forcing the assailants to retreat into nearby bushes. Believing the danger had passed, some residents emerged around 9pm. The attackers regrouped, used the call to prayer as a decoy to lure people out, and resumed the killings.
The violence finally subsided around 2am, when the terrorists withdrew into the forest, abducting women and children and leaving behind a devastated community.
